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INSTALLATIONS OF JEWISH LAW IN PUBLIC URBAN SPACE: 
AN AMERICAN ERUV CONTROVERSY 
CHARLOTTE ELISHEVA FONROBERT*
During the past two decades, the Jewish practice referred to in short as 
eruv has been brought to the attention of a variety of public forums in the 
United States. In a few prominent cases, it has even been litigated in Amer-
ican courts, such as in the Tenafly case1 and the ongoing case in the Hamp-
tons, which I discuss below. Briefly, an eruv is a practice and, more accu-
rately, an installation aiding the observance of Sabbath law as defined and 
discussed by traditional rabbinic law or halakhah. As per strictures of Jew-
ish law, observant Jews are prohibited on the Sabbath—among other 
things—to carry anything out of their houses, for instance across the street, 
to the synagogue or into a neighbor’s house. However, at the same time as 
prohibiting such behavior on the Sabbath, rabbinic law (halakhah) devised 
a set of practices—the eruv—allowing observant Jews to circumvent this 
particular Sabbath prohibition under certain circumstances. In the modern 
context, and especially in larger urban contexts, this involves the installa-
tion of boundary-marking structures where pre-existing boundary-markers, 
such as fences, walls, or creeks, are not sufficient to operate as a boundary.2
* Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert is Associate Professor of Religious Studies in the Department of Reli-
gious Studies at Stanford University, and the Director of the Taube Center for Jewish Studies. She is 
currently working on a monograph on the eruv, entitled Replacing the Nation: Judaism, Diaspora, and 
Neighborhood, and has published a number of articles on the topic.  
 1.  George James, Church and State; Drawing a Line in Tenafly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/31/nyregion/church-and-state-drawing-a-line-in-tenafly.html. See 
generally Susan H. Lees, Jewish Space in Suburbia: Interpreting the Eruv Conflict in Tenafly, New 
Jersey, 27 CONTEMP. JEWRY 42 (2007), for an ethnographic account of the controversy, and Shira J. 
Schlaff, Using an Eruv to Untangle the Boundaries of the Supreme Court’s Religion-Clause Jurispru-
dence, 5 J. CONST. L. 831 (2003), for a legal analysis of the eruv controversy, although not solely 
focused on the Tenafly case. 
 2.  Classical rabbinic law in which prescriptions for the establishment of an eruv community 
originate assumes pre-existing boundaries, paradigmatically the walls either of courtyards shared by a 
number of residents, or of alleyways, as they were typical in the ancient Mediterranean urban environ-
ment. See Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, From Separatism to Urbanism: The Dead Sea Scrolls and the 
Origins of the Rabbinic ‘Eruv, 11 DEAD SEA DISCOVERIES 43, 43–71 (2004). Accordingly, no installa-
tion of boundary-marking structures was required, other than marking the entrance to such courtyards 
and alleyways. Over the course of the history of adapting classical Jewish law to changing urban envi-
ronments, city-walls of medieval European cities were accepted as pre-existing boundaries. See Boaz 
Hutterer, The Courtyard Eruv in the Urban Space, Its Development from the Time of the Mishnah and 
the Talmud to the Twentieth Century (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bar Ilan University) (on 
file with author). The specific eruv installations became a necessity only in modern cities. See Charlotte 
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64 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
It is this installation, which—although relatively minor, relatively invisible, 
and entirely permeable because symbolic only—requires, by design, the 
Jewish community to “go public.”3 In the contemporary controversies, this 
is first and foremost the case because the installation of the structures in-
volves the public, in many cases in the form of public utility companies and 
the use of their installations in urban space. In as far as the installation of 
an eruv involves the public and in certain ways lays claim to the public, this 
particular aspect of Jewish Sabbath observance, therefore, defies the con-
signment of religion to the private sphere as is the goal of liberal democra-
cies. 
That the installation of eruvin in American urban contexts should be-
come a matter of public controversy is by no means self-evident, as those 
who regard this as an issue for church-state legislation would have us be-
lieve. Urban eruvin have been installed in many American cities without 
controversy since the 1970s.4 In fact, in some places, like New York, they 
have existed for over a century.5 The reasons for the recent controversies 
ending up in litigation are therefore complex, not only the result of more or 
less willful misperceptions of what is actually involved and at stake with 
Elisheva Fonrobert, Sabbathdraehte, Sabbathschnuere, and Judentore: The German Century in the 
History of the Eruv, in IT’S A THIN LINE: ERUV FROM TALMUDIC TO MODERN CULTURE 75–91 (Adam 
Mintz ed., KTAV Publishing House 2014), for the discussion of a nineteenth century German eruv
controversy upon de-fortification of the German cities, such as in the case of Würzburg.  
 3.  One of the conditions for the workability of an eruv, set by classical rabbinic law itself, is that 
those seeking to institute an eruv that live in mixed neighborhoods and towns have to seek the consent 
of non-Jews. Such consent takes the form of symbolic rent from representatives of non-Jews for the 
purposes of the eruv. See Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, The Political Symbolism of the Eruv, 11 JEWISH 
SOC. STUD. 9, 23–24 (2005), for a discussion of the symbolic rent as a strategy of diaspora. See also 
Hutterer, supra note 2, and Adam Mintz, Halakhah in America: The History of City Eruvin 1894–1962 
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author), for a discussion of 
the historical development of the implementation of this component of the eruv installation. Lease 
agreements spelling out the terms are available to read online, for example, Kinyan Kesef, GREATER 
BOSTON ERUV CORPORATION,
www.bostoneruv.org/kinyan_kesef.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). For an example in New York City 
from 1959, displayed at the Yeshiva University Museum in an eruv exhibition, see Zachary Paul Lev-
ine’s curatorial article, It’s A Thin Line: The Eruv and Jewish Community in New York and Beyond, in 
IT’S A THIN LINE: ERUV FROM TALMUDIC TO MODERN CULTURE 24 (Adam Mintz ed., KTAV Publish-
ing House 2014). 
 4.  This is pointed out by historians, as well as, time and again, the proponents of urban eruv
installations and their legal representatives.  
 5.  Mintz, supra note 3, focuses on the eruvin in New York, St. Louis and Toronto, but reaches 
only to 1962. The proliferation of modern eruvin installations in the United States can be attributed to a 
variety of factors that I cannot rehearse here, other than invoking the sociological and anthropological 
scholarship that traces changes in modern orthodox communities since the 1970s and the younger 
generation’s great interest in older traditions. See generally SAM FREEDMAN, JEW VS. JEW: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN JEWRY (2000). See Lees, supra note 1, at 61, for a discussion 
of the argument proposed by Rabbi Jachter, who served as an expert witness in the U.S. Appeals Court 
in the Tenafly case in 2002. Rabbi Jachter attributes that proliferation to the effects of the Civil Rights 
Acts of the 1960s that enhanced assertiveness of minority groups in the United States. 
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the installation of an eruv. They arguably have to do with local politics, 
with changing demographics and the perception or anticipation of such a 
change, and with deepening divisions among American Jews, between 
liberal and orthodox Jews. Finally, and perhaps most importantly—for our 
purposes—such controversies constitute a contestation of religion and visi-
ble religiosity in public space. 
In what follows, I will discuss the ongoing controversy in the Hamp-
tons, by first providing an analytical description of the case with reference 
to other controversies, and then by discussing its implications for the larger 
issues of religion in the public sphere. The reason I want to focus on that 
specific conflict is not so much because of the particulars of the case. In 
fact, the various controversies share quite a few aspects in common, the 
particularities of local politics notwithstanding. However, in this case, my 
own scholarly work on the origin and the cultural politics of the eruv in the 
classical rabbinic literature of the first millennium C.E. was not only called 
upon as providing testimony in the litigation, but became subject of con-
flicting interpretation in and of itself. History of religion became entangled 
with the practice of law. 
I. THE ERUV CONTROVERSY IN THE VILLAGE OF                   
WESTHAMPTON BEACH, NY
Two years ago I was contacted by a law firm from New York intro-
ducing themselves in the following manner: 
We represent a group of persons from diverse backgrounds, but largely 
reform Jews, who are opposing the eruv on constitutional, Establishment 
Clause grounds. Your name has been given to us as a leading scholar in 
this area, and a brief review of your impressive CV confirms as much. 
We are interested in an academic perspective on the issue, both to better 
educate ourselves about it but also for the purpose of steering clear of 
some of the understandably emotional or political responses that tend to 
arise when it is approached from a purely religious angle. In that regard, 
the litigation is likewise focused on the purely constitutional legal ques-
tions and is not in any way attempting to advance an anti-orthodox sen-
timent.6
I was intrigued, of course, in the sudden interest in my academic work 
in classical rabbinic legal literature by contemporary law. It did not take a 
lot of research to figure out that the eruv controversy that this lawyer allud-
ed to was one that had caught the attention of the wider public not only in 
 6.  Email from Timothy F. Hill to author (Aug. 10, 2012) (on file with author).  
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66 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
newspaper reports, as was the case in other controversies.7 Rather, this 
particular controversy had acquired some notoriety by being featured on 
Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show on the Comedy Central Channel in a faux 
interview segment by Wyatt Cenac, “The Thin Jew Line”.8 The evolving 
litigation of the case is well documented in the public sphere at the munici-
pal website of The Village of Westhampton Beach, which presents a col-
lection of the relevant court documents.9
The background of the controversy and evolution of the litigation can 
only be told in brief here.10 As a scholar of classic Jewish law and literature 
of the first millennium C.E., also known as rabbinic law and literature, I 
remained impartial to the litigation, even as I was drawn into that litigation 
itself. As a historian of religion, I consider this controversy as one particu-
lar instantiation of the long history of social dynamics between Jews in all 
their variety, and between Jews and non-Jews, that the institution of the 
eruv has rendered and continues to render visible. In as much as we can 
think about the eruv as a form of going public for Jewish observance of 
traditional Jewish law, I want to consider the relevance of the Westhamp-
ton controversy to our thinking about the mapping of religion onto the pub-
lic and private divide underwriting liberal democracy. 
 7.  See Joseph Berger, Orthodox Jews’ Request Divides a Resort Village, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/22mainli.html; see also Michael 
A. Helfand, An Eruv in the Hamptons? Why Not? The Fight over a Proposed Eruv in Westhampton 
Beach, N.Y., is About Much More Than String and Telephone Lines, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/15/opinion/la-oe-0815-helfand-eruv-westhampton-sikh-20120815. 
For the Tenafly case, see sources cited supra note 1. The Palo Alto controversy found reflection mostly 
in the Jewish Press, for example, Josh Richman, New Eruv Reopens Old Church-State Debates in Palo 
Alto, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, July 18, 2007,  
http://forward.com/articles/11190/new-eruv-reopens-old-church-state-debates-in-p-/. 
 8.  Comedy Central, The Thin Jew Line, THE DAILY SHOW (Mar. 23, 2011),  
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/1jsrl7/the-thin-jew-line. Based on personal anecdotal evidence, it 
appears that eruv proponents took a liking of this segment, clearly not so much for its general mockery 
of what to outsiders must seem like much ado about nothing. But the faux interviews end up ridiculing 
the exasperation of the opponents much more than the mechanics of the eruv installation itself. 
 9.  Eruv Information and Litigation, VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH,
http://westhamptonbeach.org/eruv-litigation/ (last updated Aug. 11, 2014). 
 10.  The opponents of the eruv in Westhampton Beach established their own website, which 
details the evolution of the controversy. JEWISH PEOPLE OPPOSED TO THE ERUV, jpoewhb.com (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2014). Other controversies have produced extensive ethnographies, with scholars 
giving credence to the variety of voices recorded in court documentation, minutes, and letters to the 
editors of local newspapers. For the extended London controversy, see generally Jennifer A. Cousineau, 
Making the Northwest London Eruv, 1988–2003: The Construction, Representation and Experience of 
a Sabbath Space (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Berkeley) (on file 
with Gardner Library, University of California Berkeley). For the Palo Alto controversy, which was 
never litigated in court, see generally John Mandsager, The ‘Eruv: A Space for Negotiating Identity 
(May 2002) (unpublished Honors Thesis in Religious Studies, Stanford University) (on file with Green 
Library, Stanford University). Susan H. Lees’ article, Jewish Space in Suburbia, provides a brief eth-
nography of the Tenafly conflict. See supra note 1.  
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In March 2008, when the modern orthodox synagogue in Westhamp-
ton Beach was about to celebrate its eighteenth anniversary in that village, 
the orthodox community proposed the installation of an eruv. To that end, 
the executive director of the orthodox community obtained a license 
agreement with the public utility companies, in this case the Long Island 
Power Authority (LIPA), to make use of some of their utility poles and 
lines, where pre-existing markers in the natural and built environment did 
not provide a contiguous boundary. A map of the boundaries for the eruv
proposed in 2008 is readily available online.11 For the purpose of an eruv
installation, use of utility poles and telephone lines entails minimal manipu-
lation, namely by the utility companies themselves affixing plastic strips on 
the poles. In rabbinic law, these plastic strips are referred to as lechis (He-
brew) or side-posts of what is to constitute symbolic gateways. In terms of 
rabbinic law going back to its founding legal text of the second century 
C.E., the Mishnah, and its interpretations and adaptations thereafter, such 
plastic strips constitute a modern symbolic emulation of what in the late 
ancient urban environment were thought of as gateways to a contained 
residential space, such as the walled courtyard or alleyways.12 However, in 
the encounter between rabbinic law and the contemporary U.S. legal sys-
tem, it is the symbolic valence of these plastic strips that are part of the 
litigation, as I will discuss. 
As the orthodox community of Westhampton Beach came forward 
with the proposal for the installation of an eruv, criticism of the project 
started to foment, even though the orthodox rabbi employed the classic 
modern arguments in defense of the eruv, namely, “the eruv will enable 
families to push small children in strollers or baby carriages when they go 
to services on the Sabbath.”13 What eruv proponent would not want to ap-
 11.  Map of Proposed Eruv Area 2008, VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH,
 http://westhamptonbeach.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/whb-eruv-map-2008.pdf  
(last updated Aug. 11, 2014). That map was extended in 2010, after the eruv proponents entered into an 
agreement with Verizon. See VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON BEACH,
http://westhamptonbeach.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/eruv-map.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).  
 12. HERBERT DANBY, THE MISHNAH 121 (Oxford University Press 1933). 
 13.  Letter from Rabbi Marc Schneier to Mayor Conrad Teller, Village of Westhampton Beach 
Board of Trustees, & Members of the Westhampton Beach Community (May 23, 2008), available at
http://westhamptonbeach.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/hampton-synagogue-letter-5-23-08.pdf. This 
argument is used over and over again for proposing urban eruvin in the contemporary United States. For 
Tenafly and Rabbi Hershel Schachter’s argument in his testimony to the U.S. Court of Appeals in 2002, 
see Lees, supra note 1, at 45. On the changing role of women in modern orthodox communities as a 
factor in the modern popularity of urban eruvin in the United States, see Blu Greenberg, The Eruv and 
the Changing Role of Women, in IT’S A THIN LINE: ERUV FROM TALMUDIC TO MODERN CULTURE 109–
21 (Adam Mintz ed., KTAV Publishing House 2014) and Sylvia Barack Fishman, Sociological Con-
texts and Complications of Eruv Construction in American Jewish Communities, in IT’S A THIN LINE:
ERUV FROM TALMUDIC TO MODERN CULTURE, 121–29 (Adam Mintz ed., KTAV Publishing House 
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peal to the basic American sense of gender equity and basic concern for the 
disabled in order to convince non-Jewish authorities of the beneficial ef-
fects of the eruv? In response to the proposal, opponents of the eruv estab-
lished themselves as a group known as the Jewish People Opposed to the 
Eruv (“JPOE”), with their own website detailing the controversy and their 
take on it.14 It bears emphasizing that this group represents itself quite ex-
plicitly and strategically as Jewish: 
Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach (Known as 
Jewish People Opposed to the Eruv), a grass roots organization of those 
of the Jewish faith, their families, friends and neighbors who are home-
owners or reside in Westhampton Beach and its environs, is opposed to 
the erection of an eruv by any governmental, quasi-governmental or cor-
porate authority in this community.15
Arguably, this aids their strategy of casting the conflict as an intra-
Jewish conflict, especially in legal terms. This is then how the law firm that 
contacted me in the email cited above represented its clients. 
In the Tenafly controversy, as in the Palo Alto controversy, Jews of a 
variety of liberal religious, political and secular backgrounds provided 
prominent voices in the opposition, but the opposition did not represent 
itself as primarily Jewish, or unified under a Jewish umbrella. Susan H. 
Lees documents the concern voiced in the Tenafly conflict over the force of 
the eruv to instigate intra-Jewish divisiveness, between “the Reformed 
Jewish people, Secular Jewish people . . . and Other Orthodox Jewish peo-
ple who are not members of the sect,”16 as a motivation by some City 
Council members to vote against its installation. But the opposition did not 
incorporate itself in the name of being Jewish. 
After initial failure of the eruv proposal in the Westhampton contro-
versy, its proponents eventually incorporated themselves as the East End 
Eruv Association Inc. (EEEA). The forming of eruv associations as the 
entity to carry forth the installation and to be responsible for the mainte-
nance of the installation has of course been the practice in almost every 
other urban eruv proposal. In May 2010, the EEEA entered an agreement 
2014). Susan H. Lees rejects the argument that the proliferation of eruv installations are to be attributed 
to “changes in the social position of women among modern Orthodox Jews” in favor of seeing it as 
about “a concept of community in which whole families constitute the community,” where gender 
forms one sub-set. Lees, supra note 1, at 44. Certainly, some contemporary proponents play up “tradi-
tional family values,” as in the case of the eruv in Washington D.C. installed in 1990. See Charlotte E. 
Fonrobert, Diaspora Cartography: On the Rabbinic Background of Contemporary Ritual Eruv Prac-
tice, 5 IMAGES: J. JEWISH ART & VISUAL CULTURE 14, 14 (2011). But either way, gender as a strategic 
argument certainly plays a central role in eruv installations, whether controversial or amicable. 
 14.  JEWISH PEOPLE OPPOSED TO THE ERUV, supra note 10. 
 15.  Id.
 16.  Council member, Richard Wilson, cited in Lees, supra note 1, at 58. 
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with an additional utility company (Verizon) to make use of their utility 
poles for the purposes of the installation of the eruv, now envisioned as 
covering a larger area. From there, the social dynamics in the Village, be-
tween what had now solidified into two opposing camps, deteriorated to the 
degree that the Village hired an attorney. The EEEA, in turn, was headed 
by an attorney who also happened to be a founding member of the Hamp-
ton Synagogue. The EEEA filed a lawsuit in Federal Court against the Vil-
lage in January 2011. That lawsuit suggested that the actions of the defend-
ants—at this point the Village and a number of named individuals—
”constitute intentional deprivation of and interference with Plaintiff’s rights 
under the United States Constitution and statutes, and private contracts 
entered into between EEEA and independent third parties,”17 namely the 
utility companies. That is, the EEEA laid claims to the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment. This is also the time when The Daily Show
became interested in the controversy for its comedic purposes and aired it’s 
now famous version of it. 
From that point forward, both camps have remained in litigation that 
has only continued to escalate. In my conversations with legal counsel on 
both sides, both have different versions of who is to blame for the escala-
tion, and I do not see myself in a position, nor consider it my interest, to 
assign blame for this. My main interest, to emphasize again, is in under-
standing the implications of the “publicness” of the eruv as an institution to 
our thinking about the place of religion in the public sphere. 
In March 2013, the JPOE and its attorney made a request to the LIPA 
to terminate its agreement with the eruv association. On July 30 of the 
same year, JPOE filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court, naming the Village 
of Westhampton Beach, the EEEA, Verizon New York Inc., and LIPA as 
defendants.18 The attorneys for JPOE claimed a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The eruv contemplated and intended for imminent construction by De-
fendant East End Eruv Association (“EEEA”), with the aid and coopera-
tion of defendants Verizon and LIPA, will mark certain wholly public 
spaces within the Village with religious significance. Indeed, it will in-
vest a large portion of the Village with a narrow and parochial religious 
function [and thus constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.]19
 17.  Complaint at 2, East End Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 828 F. Supp. 2d 
526 (2011), available at
http://westhamptonbeach.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/east-end-eruv-federal-complaint.pdf.  
 18.  Complaint at 1, Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of 
Westhampton Beach, No. CV-123760 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012), available at
http://westhamptonbeach.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/complaint-JPOE-against-village.pdf.  
 19.  Id. 
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The JPOE, therefore, relied on the First Amendment, just like the 
EEEA in its federal complaint in 2011. But while the EEEA took recourse 
to the Free Exercise Clause, the JPOE in its 2013 case turned to the Estab-
lishment Clause.20 Both parties thus copied the strategies of the parties 
involved in the Tenafly litigation. The conflict in Westhampton Beach, 
however, adds one interesting component, all publically documented, as we 
shall see momentarily. 
I received the email cited above two weeks after the JPOE filed its 
lawsuit. The request was to provide an “academic” perspective, as opposed 
to one from a “purely religious” perspective. Presumably, this can be meant 
only in institutional terms, that is, to provide an academic scholar’s per-
spective, as opposed to a rabbi’s perspective. After some conversation, I 
decided to decline the invitation, as I considered myself incapable of 
providing expertise on behalf of one side in a conflict that I understand to 
be borne by local politics, in which I did not want to intervene. The lawyers 
for the JPOE sought testimony on the violation of the Establishment Clause 
in two main ways. I did provide them with citations of those pieces of my 
published work that seemed relevant to the case. 
One component of the Establishment Clause argument concerns the 
nature of the plastic strips to be affixed to the public utility poles and 
whether indeed these are to be regarded as a religious symbol. As the plain-
tiffs argue, the plastic strips constitute “a constant and ever-present symbol, 
message, and reminder to the community at large, that the secular public 
spaces of the Village have been transformed for religious use and identity.” 
They are a “symbol of their [cef, the orthodox community’s] particular 
kind of observance permanently affixed to and openly displayed on public 
property.”21 If, so the argument goes, the lechis have to be perceived as 
religious symbols, the Village’s permission to the religious community to 
use property could constitute endorsement of a particular religious commu-
nity and would therefore violate the Establishment Clause. However, part 
of the Endorsement Test introduced by Justice O’Connor into Religion-
 20.  See Schlaff, supra note 1, at 834–835 (providing the most extensive legal discussion of 
contemporary eruv controversies yet, focusing primarily on the Tenafly case). Both the Establishment 
and Free Exercise arguments came up in the Tenafly case. See Lees, supra note 1, at 54. Suffice it to 
say that I remain unconvinced that of all the contestations of religion in the public sphere 
the eruv would be a good tool to “untangle” the bewildering jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the 
United States with regard to religion. See generally Vivian Berger, Deep Divisions over Symbolic 
Boundary: Courts Have Ruled the ‘Eruv’ a Free Exercise Accommodation; Critics Say it Entangles 
Religion with Public Property, 35 NAT’L L. J. 51, available at http://www.vberger-
mediator.com/mediation/eruv.html (discussing, albeit briefly, only First Amendment issues involved in 
the Westhampton Beach dispute). The Supreme Court itself turned down the request of the City of 
Tenafly to hear the case. See Lees, supra note 1, at 42.
 21.  Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4. 
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Clause jurisprudence requires that “irrespective of governmental pur-
pose . . . the reasonable and objective observer determines whether gov-
ernmental action has the effect of endorsing religion.”22
II. PUBLIC VISIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE AS A LEGAL
ARGUMENT
This is where the dispute over the visibility of the eruv installment be-
comes important. The factor of visibility is at the center of almost every 
recent eruv controversy, in a variety of forms and shapes, and not only 
regarding the visibility of the lechis or poles and fishing-line themselves. 
This is the case also in the Westhampton Beach dispute. The complaint 
filed by the JPOE in July 2012, introduces the visibility issue in this way: 
Although proponents of the eruv are quick to tout what they contend is 
the nearly invisible nature of the lechis [cef: the rabbinic legal term for 
the plastic strips] and other components of the eruv, it is those same pro-
ponents themselves who insist, based upon their particular interpretation 
of Jewish law, on the actual physical presence of the eruv. The eruv, of 
course, will not go unnoticed; rather, it will be a constant and ever-
present symbol, message and reminder to the community at large, that 
the secular public spaces of the Village have been transformed for reli-
gious use and identity.23
They emphasize that “indeed, the whole point of the eruv, for those 
who observe it, is to openly and visibly demarcate a certain geographic area 
as a Jewish precinct, i.e., a symbolic extension of a Jewish home.”24 The 
JPOE refers to the lechis as a “religious display,” with which “JPOE and its 
members . . . will be confronted . . . on a daily basis.”25
The dispute over the symbolic nature of the eruv installation and the 
visibility of the eruv installation is not unique to the Westhampton contro-
versy, although both the Tenafly conflict and the controversy in North 
London26 focused on different aspects of visibility, namely the change in 
 22.  See Schlaff, supra note 1 at 837. The Endorsement Test was introduced in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), but although accepted by the majority, as dis-
cussed by Schlaff, it has been subject to criticism since it is far from clear what supposedly constitutes 
an observer standard. 
 23.  Complaint, supra note 18, at 1?2. 
 24.  Id. at 3. 
 25.  Id. at 3. Even Wyatt Cenac in the Daily Show’s skit takes on the issue of visibility of the eruv
installation with both parties—the opponents’ side for exaggerating the eruv’s visibility, and the propo-
nents’ side for requiring something that is virtually invisible. The Thin Jew Line, supra note 8. See also
Adam Mintz’s Introduction to IT’S A THIN LINE: ERUV FROM TALMUDIC TO MODERN CULTURE, supra 
note 3, at xv. 
 26.  See Lees, supra note 1, at 45–46; Robert C. Ash, Mountains Suspended by a Hair: Eruv, a 
Symbolic Act by Which the Legal Fiction of Community is Established 41, 239–42 (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Leicester) (on file with University of Leicester Library). 
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 43 Side B      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P03 - FONRORBERT (WITH SMALL CHANGES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015 9:31 AM
72 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
the appearance of the neighborhood with supposedly more Orthodox Jews 
moving to town. Arguably, it would be easy enough to counter the argu-
ment over the visibility of the plastic strips on the utility poles (alias lechis)
themselves and the other components of the eruv.27 Anyone who has 
watched The Daily Show’s take on this will have to agree to that. That is, 
unless one knows that the eruv installation exists, a non-informed or rea-
sonable and objective observer will not notice it, and most certainly not be 
able to decipher its function or meaning. Even the informed observer, who 
emerges from a long, drawn-out controversy such as the one in Palo Alto, 
Tenafly, or London, will not “be confronted by” it or otherwise have his or 
her field of vision intruded upon in any significant way, as an “ever-present 
symbol.”28 This applies even to those cases, where there are no pre-existing 
utility poles and lines that can be used, and where, therefore, additional thin 
poles with fishing-lines have to be erected in order to span a street, which is 
not what was subject of debate in Westhampton Beach. As far as I know, 
no study exists to prove this point. If one were to stop the hundreds and 
perhaps thousands of cars that cross each day under the fishing-line span-
ning one of the major roads leading into the city of Palo Alto, and asked the 
drivers whether they had noticed that self-same fishing-line, or the posts on 
either side of the road supporting it, there is simply no doubt that not a 
single one of the drivers would be able to answer in the affirmative. The 
same would be true, even more so, for the lechis on the pre-existing utility 
poles. In that regard, these components of the eruv installation defy the 
semantic purpose of what makes a religious symbol a symbol, and a reli-
gious one at that, to a reasonable and objective observer: they are barely 
noticeable and do not bear any inherent significance or message. They are 
not readable in the way a cross is readable to the public, or the way even a 
menorah or a creche are readable, because they signify something in and of 
themselves. Compared to church, synagogue, and mosque buildings, and 
their minarets and steeples, the eruv constitutes a minimalist intervention 
in, and manipulation of, the built environment. Thus, the lechis mean noth-
ing other than to those who rely on them as to their Sabbath observance. 
Arguably, however, it might be beyond the Court’s jurisprudence to figure 
out what it is that constitutes a “religious” symbol. 
 27.  Complaint, supra note 18, at 1?2 (detailing argument by plaintiffs). 
 28.  This is aside from the fact that utility poles and the poles with fishing-line are not centrally 
located in the neighborhood but at the margins, and in that sense, already defy visibility. 
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III. INTRA-JEWISH SECTARIANISM AS A LEGAL ARGUMENT
The second component of the complaint, however, is unique so far to 
the Westhampton Beach dispute, at least in its overt nature. The JPOE 
complaint seeks to cast the eruv installation as a sectarian Jewish project, 
and this is where the incorporation of the opposition of JPOE becomes 
relevant. The document spells out: “Many Jews reject the very concept of 
an eruv, and sincerely believe that the particular form of Jewish belief and 
observance that elevates such legalistic constructs over the true spiritual 
values of Judaism and the Sabbath is abhorrent to their own religious views 
and interpretation of Jewish law.”29 This is an absolutely amazing move for 
a legal argument, since now the lawyers lay claim to an authentic (“true”) 
understanding of Judaism. They are taking recourse to a supposedly author-
itative decision, issued by the rabbinic umbrella organization of Reform 
Judaism, the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR). The law-
yers read the CCAR’s recommendation to have rejected the eruv outright: 
“Indeed, it is the official position of the Central Conference of American 
Rabbi (‘CCAR’), . . . that an eruv is a sort of ‘legal fiction’ which is incon-
sistent with the true ‘spirit’ of Jewish law.”30 In other words, the dispute is 
now cast as one over the correct interpretation of Sabbath law and its ob-
servance, rather than as one over divergent versions of Judaism. The Vil-
lage’s permission for the eruv installation would therefore constitute an 
Establishment Clause infraction, as government would give preference to 
one side of an intra-religious dispute, or could be “reasonably seen and 
understood by them [cef: JPOE and its members] as endorsing particular 
 29.  Complaint, supra note 18, at 2. 
 30.  Id. Collections of rabbinic legal opinions constitute a historical practice that is part of tradi-
tional Jewish halakhic literature. See AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH 
LAW 207–10, 281–82, 362–63 (N.S. Hecht et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996). The Reform move-
ment continues to think of its rabbinical opinions as responsa, even though the articulation of rabbinical 
opinions follows a very different style of legal argumentation and interpretation than traditional respon-
sa literature. This is by no means to say that such opinions do not represent valid articulations of Juda-
ism, authentic ones in their own right, any more or less than contemporary Jewish orthodox responsa.
Reform responsa are readily available online at http://ccarnet.org/rabbis-speak/reform-
responsa/index/, and this particular responsum can be found at http://ccarnet.org/responsa/carr-268-
269/. In either case, Rabbi Wohl, who wrote the responsum in question in 1984, does not invoke the 
‘true’ spirit of Jewish law. See Contemporary American Reform Responsa: 178. Eruv, CENT. CONF. OF 
AM. RABBIS (July 1983), http://ccarnet.org/responsa/carr-268-269/; see also Declaration of Rabbi 
David Saperstein at 2, East End Eruv Ass’n. v. Town of Southhampton, No. 2:13-cv-4810 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 28, 2013) (Rabbi David Saperstein, who was then the Director and Counsel of the Religious Action 
Center of Reform Judaism in Washington D.C., declared that the wording of that responsum “is ad-
dressed to whether the Reform community believes the eruv is important for us to observe the Sabbath, 
not what a standard for the whole Jewish community ought to be”).  
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religious beliefs and practices that they do not hold or which they affirma-
tively oppose.”31
This is where two arguments that I advance in my reading of classical 
rabbinic law in its historical context came to play a role in legal argumenta-
tion: First, I have argued in print that the invention of the eruv in early rab-
binic law could in that context be considered sectarian for the following 
reasons. We have strong textual evidence that a variety of Jewish groups 
and movements, such as represented in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Book 
of Jubilees preceding the rabbinic texts, observed the prohibition of carry-
ing objects out of the house, tent, or an otherwise private residence as one 
of the Sabbath prohibitions. The rabbis were the only ones to devise the 
eruv as a mechanism to allow Jews to do just that on the Sabbath.32 But the 
point of considering the rabbinic legal strategy as in some way sectarian 
within the late ancient Jewish landscapes was to read the rabbinic strategies 
of casting the innovations of its own law making and legal interpretations 
of biblical law for what they were, namely strategies of persuading follow-
ers of the authoritativeness of their legal authority. Among scholars of clas-
sical rabbinic literature and law, this is a common view by now, beyond 
matters related to the eruv. The contemporary Jewish landscape in the 
United States is a very different religious and Jewish landscape compared 
to the late ancient, not least of all because by now the discourse and prac-
tice of eruv have been around for almost two millennia of Jewish cultural 
history. Therefore, it is difficult to construe the eruv as a misinterpretation 
of Jewish Sabbath law, even though the biblical Sabbath law does not con-
tain much that would suggest such a construct. Nor does it make much 
sense to consider the eruv “sectarian” unless one considered rabbinic law 
(halakhah) altogether a sectarian form of Judaism. This is not to say that 
the institution of an eruv is the only possible, only appropriate, or even only 
authentic way to observe the Sabbath. Such determination is beyond the 
realm of scholarship and a matter of religious belief and interpretation. 
Second, another argument I advance in my reading of classic rabbinic 
texts—one that I hold by—is that the institution of the eruv served the early 
rabbis as a mechanism to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders, 
between those that belong, and those that are beyond the purview of the 
strictures of rabbinic law. Over the course of history, that distinction in 
general has taken on various valences, depending on historical circum-
stances, and certainly at times rabbinic scholars did not look upon those 
 31.  Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. 
 32.  Fonrobert, supra note 2, at 48–51. 
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beyond their purview with generosity and grace, to put it kindly. This the 
rabbis share with numerous other religious groups that define their identity 
by a variety of practices of belonging. The eruv is just one such strategy to 
draw a boundary between insider and outsider, in this case, by way of a 
spatial practice. The lawyer for JPOE, Jonathan Sinnreich, seized upon this 
historical and anthropological argument to underline the exclusionary 
mechanism of the eruv:
[I]t is a symbol that communicates a deliberately divisive and indeed ex-
clusionary message, at least as understood within the larger Jewish 
community. This divisive and exclusionary meaning has been insightful-
ly described by Professor Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert.33
In some ways, this amounts to contesting in court that the Catholic 
Church excludes Protestants (and non-Jews) from its sacraments. That is to 
say, of course the project of defining a collective identity is to define 
boundaries between those who belong and those who do not, those who 
define themselves in those terms, and those who do not. The special force 
of the eruv, especially in its contemporary urban implementation, is to do 
so by installing what are perceived physical boundary markers in the urban 
landscape, thus by drawing on geography to underwrite collective identity. 
Sinnreich is not the only one who simply equates the late ancient rab-
bis and their opponents with contemporary (modern) orthodox Jews and 
Reform and other liberal Jews or non-Jews. As an anthropologist, Susan H. 
Lees does so as well. She explains the acrimony of the Tenafly dispute in 
the following way: 
[The eruv] creates a kind of residential commune that, as in rabbinic 
days, excludes or distances non-Jews and co-resident Jews who are not 
believers or not observant of rabbinic law as understood by its members. 
I propose that this exclusion lies, in part, at the heart of the bitterness of 
the dispute in Tenafly.34
However, the path from the ancient past to the contemporary Jewish 
scene in urban America is not a straight path, and clearly, exclusion in 
terms of self-distinction from others is not simply the same as exclusion as 
a political tool of majorities with respect to minorities. 
CONCLUSION
The practice of eruv presents us with a particular form of religious 
claim to the public, or publicness, and for that reason has seemed to so 
 33.  Statement of Jonathan Sinnreich, Esq. on Behalf of Jewish People for the Betterment of 
Westhampton Beach, JEWISH PEOPLE OPPOSED TO THE ERUV 3 (April 4, 2013), available at
http://jpoewhb.com/uploads/PDF_Number_5.pdf. 
 34.  Lees, supra note 1, at 46.  
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many to pose a challenge to First Amendment jurisdiction. Those involved 
in the recent controversies, as the one discussed above, argue in terms of 
First Amendment strictures and protection, whether by calling upon the 
Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. Anthropologists and 
ethnographers, as well as historians of religion such as myself, draw on 
different explanations to explain the potentiality for controversy built into 
the eruv installation. 
By way of conclusion, I wish to emphasize one aspect of the eruv in-
stallation that escapes any firm grasp of the challenge that it really poses; 
that is what kind of claim to the public the eruv really poses. We have seen 
that visibility plays a role, yet the eruv installation is barely perceptible. 
Outright denial of perceptibility, however, does not help either with the 
resolution of the recent disputes,35 since, from the days of the Mishnah 
onwards, rabbinic law does in fact require a manipulation of the urban en-
vironment, minute as it may be. The fact that classical rabbinic law did not 
conceive of any conflict regarding the manipulation of the urban environ-
ment as they conceived of it is telling with regard to the contemporary con-
text. As pointed out above, in the ancient context, the rabbinic sages only 
considered manipulation of the entrance to a shared space because contain-
ing and contiguous walls pre-existed in the late ancient urban environment 
and were not considered an interference with one’s daily life. In the con-
temporary context, the installation of symbolic gateways has to signify that 
there are also symbolic walls somewhere in the urban landscape, even if 
they are entirely symbolic and intangible, such as in the form of a creek 
that forms part of the boundary. Nonetheless, the very fact that now an eruv
installation takes the form of inscriptions on maps, readily accessible 
online, clearly provides conceptual fodder for the perception that the Jew-
ish community is laying claim to a geographical area of a town. Drawing 
maps of urban areas based on religious identity and practice is a form of 
laying claim to public space, however symbolic that may be. The fact that 
no one can see the plastic strips becomes totally insignificant in light of 
that.
 35.  In this regard, I think, Sinnreich has to be given credence in his federal complaint filed on 
behalf of JPOE when he argues that: 
the suggestion that JPOE’s members should not be concerned or offended by the prospect of 
the creation of an eruv to demarcate the neighborhoods where they live and work, because 
they ‘won’t notice it’ or might somehow not understand what it symbolizes, is truly conde-
scending and offensive to JPOE and its members. 
Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. If the proponents cannot adequately explain the importance of the 
eruv for themselves, they are to be blamed for the failure of the eruv as a communal project. 
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The symbolic nature of the eruv is what requires public negotiation in 
order to explain such maps. And here I want to conclude with what I still 
consider the radical and subversive nature of the eruv, in spite of all the 
anxiety it has created in the recent conflicts: the eruv imposes a layer of 
meaning onto an urban map that is anchored minimally in the physical 
urban landscape. As a layer of meaning, it creates a new form of public—
one that makes the urban environment legible in terms of ancient Jewish 
law, but in such a way that it would allow for any other forms of public to 
be part of it. An eruv may include a church parish, as it most certainly does 
in the case of larger urban eruvin, and thus include the form of public that 
the parish establishes. It may include the White House or the European 
Parliament and thus the most public form of public imaginable. In such 
cases, the eruv adds a dimension rather than shielding or suppressing an-
other. It defies all forms of isomorphism that require an equation between 
collective identity and physical environment. And it is this dimension that 
has yet to play out its full potential. 
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